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Evaluation of Speaker Verification Security and
Detection of HMM-based Synthetic Speech
Phillip L. De Leon, Member, IEEE, Michael Pucher, Member, IEEE, Junichi Yamagishi,
Inma Hernaez, and Ibon Saratxaga
Abstract—In this paper, we evaluate the vulnerability of
speaker verification (SV) systems to synthetic speech. The SV
systems are based on either the Gaussian mixture model-
universal background model (GMM-UBM) or support vector
machine (SVM) using GMM supervectors. We use a hidden
Markov model (HMM)-based text-to-speech (TTS) synthesizer,
which can synthesize speech for a target speaker using small
amounts of training data through model adaptation of an average
voice or background model. Although the SV systems have a very
low equal error rate (EER), when tested with synthetic speech
generated from speaker models derived from the Wall-Street
Journal (WSJ) speech corpus, over 81% of the matched claims
are accepted. This result suggests vulnerability in SV systems and
thus a need to accurately detect synthetic speech. We propose
a new feature based on relative phase shift (RPS), demonstrate
reliable detection of synthetic speech, and show how this classifier
can be used to improve security of SV systems.
Index Terms—speaker recognition, speech synthesis, security
I. INTRODUCTION
THE objective in speaker verification (SV) is to accept orreject a claim of identity based on a voice sample [1].
Many investigations on the imposture problem as related to SV
have been reported over the years as well as methods to prevent
such impostures. The simplest imposture is playback of a voice
recording for a targeted speaker and the well-known solution
is a text-prompted approach [2]. In addition, the vulnerability
of SV to voice mimicking by humans has also been examined
in [3], [4]. On the other hand, advanced speech technologies
present new problems for SV systems including imposture
using speech manipulation of a recorded voice via analysis-by-
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resynthesis methods [5]–[7], voice conversion of the recorded
voice [8]–[11], and diphone speech synthesis methods [7].
The use of synthesized speech potentially poses two related
problems for SV systems. The first problem is confirmation
of an acquired speech signal as having originated from a
particular individual. In this case, the speech signal might be
incorrectly confirmed as having originated from an individual
when in fact the speech signal is synthetic. The second
problem is in remote or on-line authentication where voice
is used. In this case, a synthesized speech signal could be
used to wrongly gain access to a person’s account and text-
prompting would not present a problem for a text-to-speech
(TTS) system. In both of these problems, the speech model
for the synthesizer must be targeted to a specific person’s
voice. SV is also being used in forensic applications [12]
and therefore security against imposture is also of obvious
importance.
The problem of imposture against SV systems using syn-
thetic speech was first published over 10 years ago by Masuko,
et al. [13]. In their original work, the authors used a hidden
Markov model (HMM)-based text-prompted SV system [2]
and an HMM-based TTS synthesizer. In the SV system, feature
vectors were scored against speaker and background models
composed of concatenated phoneme models. The acoustic
models used in the speech synthesizer were adapted to each
of the human speakers [14], [15]. When tested with 20 human
speakers, the system had a 0% false acceptance rate (FAR)
and 7.2% false rejection rate (FRR); when tested with synthetic
speech, the system accepted over 70% of matched claims, i.e. a
synthetic signal matched to a targeted speaker and an identity
claim of that same speaker.
In subsequent work by Masuko, et al. [16], the authors
extended the research in two ways. First, they improved
their synthesizer by generating speech using F0 (fundamen-
tal frequency) information. Second, they improved their SV
system by utilizing both F0 and spectral information. The F0
modeling techniques used in synthesis were the same used in
the SV system. By improving the SV system, the authors were
able to lower the matched claim rate for synthetic speech to
32%, however, the FAR for the human speech increased to
1.8%.
In the last 10 years, both SV and TTS systems have
improved dramatically. Around the same time as Masuko’s
work, Gaussian mixture model-universal background model
(GMM-UBM) SV systems were first proposed [1]. Since this
time, GMM-UBM based SV systems have produced excellent
performance and have achieved equal error rates (EERs) of
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0.1% on the TIMIT corpus (ideal recordings) and 12% on
NIST 2002 Speaker Recognition Evaluations (SRE) (non-
ideal recordings) [17], [18]. Newer systems based on support
vector machines (SVMs) using GMM supervectors have been
proposed and in some cases can lead to lower EERs [19], [20].
Until recently, developing a TTS synthesizer for a targeted
speaker required a large amount of speech data from a
carefully prepared transcript in order to construct the speech
model. However, with a state-of-the-art HMM-based TTS
synthesizer [21], the speech model can now be adapted from an
average model (derived from other speakers) or a background
model (derived from one speaker) using only a small amount
of speech data. Moreover, recent experiments with HMM-
based speech synthesis systems have also demonstrated that
the speaker-adaptive HMM-based speech synthesis is robust
to non-ideal speech data that are recorded under various con-
ditions and with varying microphones, that are not perfectly
clean, and/or that lack phonetic balance. In [22] a high-quality
voice was built from audio collected off of the Internet. This
data was not recorded in a studio, had a small amount of
background noise, and the microphones varied in the data.
Further [23] reported construction of thousands of voices for
HMM-based speech synthesis based on corpora such as the
Wall Street Journal (WSJ0, WSJ1, and WSJCAM0), Resource
Management, Globalphone and SPEECON. Taken together,
these state-of-the-art speech synthesizers pose new challenges
to SV systems.
In prior work, we utilized a state-of-the-art TTS synthe-
sizer and revisited the problem of imposture using a GMM-
UBM SV system with a small speech corpus [24] and then
extended to a larger corpus [25]. Recently, we examined
the performance using the SVM-based SV system and initial
experiments on detecting a synthetic speech signal [26]. In
this paper, we provide complete evaluations using both GMM-
UBM and SVM-based SV systems and new results from a
proposed synthetic speech detector (SSD) which uses phase-
based features for classification. First, we train two different
SV systems (GMM-UBM and SVM using GMM supervectors)
using human speech (283 speakers from the WSJ corpus).
Second, we create synthetic test speech for each of the 283
speakers by adapting a background model to the targeted
speaker. Finally, we measure EER and true acceptance rates
when tested using human speech and measure the matched
claim rate using synthetic speech. As we will demonstrate, the
matched claim rate is above 81% for each of the SV systems
hence the vulnerability of the SV systems to synthetic speech.
Next, we turn our attention to detection of synthetic speech
as a means to prevent imposture by synthetic speech. We
summarize results with a previously-proposed method which
uses average inter-frame difference of log-likelihood (IFDLL)
[27] and show that this is no longer a viable discriminator
for high-quality synthetic speech such as that which we are
using. Instead, we propose a new discrimination feature based
on relative phase shift (RPS) and show that this can be used to
reliably detect synthetic speech. We also show a simple and
effective method for training the classifier using transcoded
human speech as a surrogate for synthetic speech.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sections II and III,
we provide brief overviews of the SV and TTS systems.
In Section IV, we review IFDLL and provide details on
our proposed RPS feature for detecting synthetic speech. In
Section V, we describe the WSJ corpus and explain how
we partitioned the corpus for training and testing of all the
required systems. We note that although the WSJ corpus is
not a standard corpus for SV research, it is one of the few that
provides sufficient speech material from hundreds of speakers
which is required to construct synthetic voices matched to their
human counterparts. Section VI gives the evaluation results
using the WSJ corpus and its synthesized counterpart as well
as the results when using RPS to detect synthetic speech.
Finally, we conclude the article in Section VII.
II. SPEAKER VERIFICATION SYSTEMS
Our SV systems are based on the well-known GMM-UBM
described in [17] and the SVM using GMM supervectors
described in [19]. We briefly review these systems and our
implementation in the following subsections.
A. SV System Training
For both SV systems, T feature vectors X =
{x1,x2, . . . ,xT } are extracted every 10 ms using a 25 ms
hamming window and composed of 15 mel-frequency cepstral
coefficients (MFCCs), 15 delta MFCCs, log energy, and delta-
log energy as elements. We apply feature warping to the
vectors in order to improve robustness [28] which is adequate
given the high-quality recordings in the WSJ corpus.
Training the GMM-UBM system is composed of two stages,
shown in Fig. 1(a) and (b). The SVM using GMM supervectors
system includes these two stages and two additional stages
shown in Fig. 1(c) and (d). In the first stage, a GMM-UBM
consisting of the model parameters λUBM = {wi,ηi,Σi} is
constructed from the collection of speakers’ feature vectors.
Here, we assume M = 512 component densities in the
GMM-UBM and wi, ηi, and Σi represent respectively the
weight, mean vector, and diagonal covariance matrix of the i-
th component density where 1 ≤ i ≤M . These parameters are
estimated using the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm.
In practice the GMM-UBM is constructed from non-target
speakers.
In the second stage, feature vectors are extracted from target
speakers’ utterances. We assume the availability of several
utterances per speaker recorded (preferably) under different
channel conditions in order to improve the speaker modeling
and robustness of the system. Feature vectors from each
utterance are used to maximum a posteriori (MAP)-adapt only
the mean vectors of the GMM-UBM to form speaker- and
utterance-dependent models λs,u = {wi,µs,u,i,Σi} where
µs,u,i is the MAP-adapted mean vector of the i-th component
density from speaker s and utterance u.
In the third stage (used for the SVM), the mean vectors
µs,u,i are then diagonally-scaled according to
ms,u,i =
√
wiΣ
−1/2
i µs,u,i (1)
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Fig. 1. Stages of training the SV systems. The GMM-UBM SV system is
trained with (a)-(b) and the SVM SV system is trained with (a)-(d). Although
the GMM-UBM is normally derived from non-target speakers, as described
in Section V, we have used target speakers.
and stacked to form a GMM supervector for a speaker’s given
utterance
ms,u =
 ms,u,1...
ms,u,M
 . (2)
In the fourth stage (used for the SVM), the target speaker’s
supervectors are labeled as +1 and all other speakers’ super-
vectors as −1. Parameters (weights, an and bias, b) of the
SVM using a linear kernel are computed for each speaker
through an optimization process. As derived in [29], an
appropriately-chosen distance measure between the mean vec-
tors µs,u,i, results in a corresponding linear kernel involving
the supervectors in (2) composed of diagonally-scaled mean
vectors (1).
In conventional GMM-UBM SV systems, we normally
assume a single training signal (or several utterances concate-
nated to form a single training signal) so that the s-th speaker
model is simply λs = {wi, µs,i,Σi}. For the SVM, the speaker
model is denoted νs = {as,n, bs} where as,n is the weight of
the n-th support vector, bs is the bias, and n ∈ S and S is the
set of indices of the support vectors.
B. SV System Testing
In SV system testing we are given an identity claim C and
feature vectors X from a test utterance and must accept or
reject the claim. For the GMM-UBM system, we compute the
log-likelihood ratio
Λ(X) = log p(X|λC)− log p(X|λUBM). (3)
where
log p(X|λ) = 1
R
R∑
n=1
log p(xn|λ) (4)
and R is the number of test feature vectors. The claimant
speaker is accepted if
Λ(X) ≥ θ (5)
where θ is the decision threshold. In the SVM system, the
supervector mtest is computed from the feature vectors X by
essentially repeating stages 2 and 3 from training. We then
compute
y(X) =
∑
n∈S
aC,nlC,nm
T
testmC,n + bC (6)
where lC,n denotes the labels associated with the support
vectors and accept the claim if y(X) ≥ 0.
III. TEXT-TO-SPEECH SYNTHESIZER
Our TTS systems are based on the well-known statistical
parametric speech synthesis framework described in [21]. The
speaker adaptation techniques of the framework allows us to
generate a personalized synthetic voice using as little as a few
minutes of recorded speech from a target speaker and we use
the techniques for building the personalized synthetic voices
for hundreds of speakers1. In the following subsections, we
briefly review our TTS systems and our implementation.
A. TTS System Training
Our TTS system is built using the framework from the
“HTS-2008” system [22], which was a speaker-adaptive sys-
tem entered for the Blizzard Challenge 2008 [31]. In the
challenge, the system had the equal best naturalness and the
equal best intelligibility on a training data set comprising one
hour of speech. The system was also found to be as intelligible
as human speech [32]. The speech synthesis system consists
of three main components: speech analysis and average voice
training, speaker adaptation, and speech generation.
In the speech analysis and the average voice training
component, three kinds of parameters for the STRAIGHT
(Speech Transformation and Representation by Adaptive
Interpolation of weiGHTed spectrogram [33]) mel-cepstral
vocoder with mixed excitation (i.e., 39-dimensional mel-
cepstral coefficients, logF0 and five-dimensional band-limited
aperiodicity measures) are extracted as feature vectors for
HMMs [34]. Context-dependent, multi-stream, left-to-right,
multi-space distribution (MSD), hidden semi-Markov models
(HSMMs) [35] are trained on multi-speaker databases in order
to simultaneously model the acoustic features and duration. A
set of model parameters (Gaussian mean vectors and diag-
onal covariance matrices) for the speaker-independent MSD-
HSMMs are estimated using the EM algorithm. First, speaker-
independent monophone MSD-HSMMs are trained from an
initial segmentation, converted into context-dependent MSD-
HSMMs, and re-estimated. Then, decision-tree-based context
1We are not considering unit selection and concatenative speech synthesis
which is used in some commercial speech synthesizers [30]. Developing the
unit selection and concatenation synthesizer for a targeted speaker requires a
large amount of speech data, at least one hour, from a carefully prepared
transcript. Therefore, we believe this approach is unlikely to be used, in
practice, for imposture against SV systems in contrast to HMM-based TTS
systems, which requires much smaller amounts of speech. It is possible,
however, to use “voice conversion” techniques to change the speaker in the
unit selection synthesizer and there are reports [8]–[11] of this approach
being used for imposture against SV systems. We note that voice conversion
approaches use similar vocoders to statistical parametric speech synthesis and
we hypothesize that the proposed synthetic speech detection method would
also be effective with voice conversions.
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clustering with the minimum description length (MDL) crite-
rion [36] is applied to the HSMMs and the model param-
eters of the HSMMs are tied at leaf nodes. The clustered
HSMMs are re-estimated again. The clustering processes are
repeated twice and the whole process is further repeated twice
using segmentation labels refined with the trained models
in a bootstrap manner. All re-estimation and re-segmentation
processes utilize speaker-adaptive training (SAT) [37] based on
constrained maximum likelihood linear regression (CMLLR)
[38].
B. TTS System Adaptation
In the speaker adaptation component, the speaker-
independent MSD-HSMMs are transformed by using con-
strained structural maximum a posteriori linear regression
(CSMAPLR) [39]. Note that not only output pdfs for the
acoustic features but also duration models are transformed in
the speaker adaptation. This adaptation requires as little as a
few minutes of recorded speech from a target speaker in order
to generate a personalized synthetic voice.
C. TTS System Synthesis
In the speech generation component, acoustic feature pa-
rameters are generated from the adapted MSD-HSMMs using
a parameter generation algorithm that considers both the
global variance of a trajectory to be generated and trajectory
likelihood [40]. Finally an excitation signal is generated using
mixed excitation (pulse plus band-filtered noise components)
and pitch-synchronous overlap and add (PSOLA) [41]. This
signal is used to excite a mel-logarithmic spectrum approxima-
tion (MLSA) filter [42] corresponding to the STRAIGHT mel-
cepstral coefficients to generate the synthetic speech wave-
form.
IV. DETECTION OF SYNTHETIC SPEECH
In this section, we begin by evaluating the average IFDLL,
previously proposed in [27] to detect synthetic speech. As
we demonstrate, average IFDLL is no longer a viable dis-
criminator for state-of-the-art HMM-based synthetic speech
such as that which we are using. Based on these results, we
then propose a more accurate GMM-based classifier based on
the RPS feature. The use of a phase-based feature extracted
directly from the speech signal is a novel application in the
detection of synthetic speech.
A. Average inter-frame difference of log-likelihood
The IFDLL is defined as [27]
∆n = | log p(xn|λC)− log p(xn−1|λC)| (7)
and the average IFDLL is given by
∆¯ =
1
R
R∑
n=1
∆n. (8)
The authors in [27] observed that for synthetic speech, average
IFDLL is significantly lower than that for human speech and
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2 4.4 4.6
0
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1.5
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2.5
3
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Average Inter−Frame Difference of Log−Likelihood (IFDLL) Distributions
 
 
Human Speech
Synthetic Speech
Fig. 2. Approximate distributions of average interframe-difference of log-
likelihood for human and synthetic speech. Due to the overlapping distribu-
tions, the average IFDLL cannot be used to detect synthetic speech.
can be used as a discriminator. This difference was explained
as a result of the HMM-based synthesizer, used in the work,
generating a speech parameter sequence so as to maximize
the output probability. This maximization normally leads to a
time variation of the speech parameters of synthetic speech
becoming smaller than that for human speech.
In Fig. 2 we show the approximate distributions of aver-
age IFDLL for human and synthetic speech using the 283
speaker WSJ corpus (subsets HS-B and TTS-B as described
in Section V). Using the state-of-the-art HMM-based speech
synthesizer described in Section III, this measure no longer
appears to be robust enough to detect synthetic speech, since
the distributions of average IFDLL for human and synthetic
speech have significant overlap. In [25], we also showed
that dynamic-time-warping of MFCC features and automatic
speech recognition (ASR) word-error-rate are also not robust
measures to detect synthetic speech.
B. Relative Phase Shift
Since the human auditory system is known to be relatively
insensitive to the speech signal’s phase [43], the vocoder used
in TTS is normally based on a minimum-phase vocal tract
model for simplicity. This simplification leads to differences in
the phase spectra between human and synthetic speech which
are not usually audible. However, these differences can be used
to construct a new feature which allows detection of synthetic
speech.
We propose using the RPS representation of the harmonic
phase as a discriminating feature for detecting synthetic
speech. The RPS is described in [44], [45] and is based on the
harmonic modeling of the speech signal [46]. In these models,
the harmonic part of the speech signal may be represented as
h(t) =
∑
k
Ak(t) cos [Φk (t)] (9)
where Ak(t) is the amplitude and
Φk(t) = 2piF0kt+ θk (10)
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is the instantaneous phase of the k-th harmonic. Here we
denote the initial phase of the k-th harmonic as θk. The
RPS values for every harmonic are then calculated from the
instantaneous phase Φk(t) at each analysis instant ta using
RPSk = Φk(ta)− kΦ1(ta). (11)
More specifically, this transformation removes the linear phase
contribution due to the frequency of every harmonic from the
instantaneous phase and allows a clear phase structure to arise,
as shown in Fig. 3. The RPS values for voiced segments are
illustrated in Fig. 3(b) and show a structured pattern along
frequency as the signal evolves.
In order to use RPS values as features for classification and
detection of synthetic speech, several important steps must be
carried out. These steps were initially developed for an ASR
task [45] and are listed below:
1) Due to the variable number of harmonics found in
a predefined frequency range, the dimensionality of
the vector of RPS values varies from frame to frame.
We transform the variable-dimension vectors into fixed-
dimension vectors by applying a Mel-scale filter bank
with 32 filters.
2) The dimensionality of the RPS vector is very high,
if the usual analysis bandwidth is considered. This is
problematic for training any statistical model, therefore
RPS values are computed over a frequency range from
0 to 4 kHz and the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is
used at the end of the process to decorrelate and reduce
the dimensionality.
3) The RPS values in (11) are wrapped phase values
and therefore may create discontinuities as shown in
Fig. 4(a)-(b). This is also problematic for parameteri-
zation. Therefore we unwrap the phase in order to avoid
the discontinuities in the RPS envelope.
4) Due to its accumulative, non-linear nature, the unwrap-
ping process leads to very different RPS envelopes even
if they derive from similar initial data as shown in
Fig. 4(c)-(d). If we differentiate the unwrapped RPS
envelope the accumulative effect is eliminated, the range
of the curve is limited to [−pi, pi] , and thus similarities
between envelopes are more properly perceived. This
can be seen in Fig. 4(e)-(f).
In order to develop a classifier for synthetic speech, we
compute 20 coefficients per speech frame according to steps
1-4. The mean of the differentiated unwrapped RPS (i.e. the
mean slope of the unwrapped RPS) has been removed before
calculating the DCT and added as a parameter, resulting in
a total of 21 coefficients per frame which are used as a
feature vector, yt for the classifier. Here only voiced segments
of the signals have been used, because there is no useful
phase information in unvoiced frames. The voiced/unvoiced
decision is made using the cepstrum-based pitch detection
(CDP) algorithm [47]. The RPS values are then extracted using
a 10 ms frame-rate.
For the SSD, we use a 32-component density GMM in the
classifier trained on RPS feature vectors extracted from human
and synthetic speech signals. Detection of synthetic speech
Test
signal RPS
likelihood ratio
for speaker C 
ΛRPS(Y)
SV systems ΛRPS(Y) > 0 
Synthetic speech
Reject
A
cc
ep
t 
YES
NO
Claimed
speaker
C
Human speech from speaker C
RPS feature
extraction
s, C Y
Fig. 5. Proposed system for detection of synthesized speech after speaker
verification using phase-based detection.
occurs once the speaker verification system has accepted the
identity (see Fig. 5)–currently, we see no need to apply the
SSD if the SV system has rejected the identity. If an identity
claim, C is accepted, we compute the log-likelihood ratio
ΛRPS(Y) = log p(Y|λC,human)− log p(Y|λC,synth) (12)
where Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yT } is the sequence of RPS feature
vectors and λC,human and λC,synth represent GMMs of the
RPS feature vectors for human and synthetic speech associated
with claimant C, respectively. The speaker is then classified as
human if ΛRPS(Y) > 0, otherwise it is classified as synthetic.
V. DATA SETS
For this research, we use the WSJ corpus from the Linguistic
Data Consortium (LDC) [48]. Although the WSJ corpus is
not a standard corpus for SV research, it is one of the few
corpora that provides several hundred speakers and sufficiently
long signals required for constructing each of the components
within the TTS, SV, and SSD systems [49]. From the corpus,
we chose the pre-defined official training data set, SI-284, that
includes both WSJ0 and WSJ1 as material data. The SI-284 set
has a total of 81 hours of speech data uttered by 283 speakers
and was partitioned into three disjoint “human speech” subsets
HS-A, HS-B, and HS-C, as shown in Table I. Subset HS-A was
used to train the TTS system described in Section III, subset
HS-B was used to train the SV and SSD systems described
in Sections II and IV-B, and subset HS-C was used to test
the SV and SSD systems. Once trained, the TTS system was
used to generate the synthetic speech subsets TTS-B and TTS-
C as shown in Table I which are used to train the SSD and
test the SV and SSD systems, respectively. These different
subsets were used to avoid any overlapping of data sets and
associated cross-corpus negative effects while attempting to
simulate realistic imposture scenarios2.
Training the SSD with synthetic speech has a practical
disadvantage, that is, a TTS synthesizer has to be trained
for each speaker in the SV system. Therefore, we have also
evaluated a more practical method that uses the STRAIGHT
vocoder to transcode the human speech signal as a surrogate
for TTS-generated (synthesized) speech. By transcoding, the
human speech signal is parametrized using a vocoder and
from this parameterization, the speech signal is reconstructed
in a process similar to that in the TTS speech generation
2In future work, the average voice model of the TTS should be derived
from a different corpus.
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Fig. 3. Phasegrams of a voiced speech segment for five continuous vowels. a) Intantaneous phases b) Relative phase shift c) Signal waveform
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Fig. 4. RPS information for two sustained —i— speech segments of 200ms (20 frames) by two male speakers: (a-b) RPS, (c-d) unwrapped RPS, (e-f)
differentiation of the unwrapped RPS
component. The transcoded human speech signal has artifacts
similar to those in the synthetic speech signal which can be
useful for simplifying the training of the SSD. In order to
evaluate this approach, we transcoded subset HS-B and created
the CS-B “coded speech” subset as shown in Table I. By
using CS-B instead of TTS-B to train the SSD, all system
components (TTS, SV, SSD) can be trained using only human
speech.
Since each speaker included in the SI-284 set has different
speech durations, we used varying lengths (73 sec to 27 min)
of training signals from subset HS-A to construct and adapt
the TTS system to each speaker. Some speakers have larger
amounts of data than those we can practically collect for the
imposture against the SV system.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Evaluation of Speaker Verification Systems
For the two SV systems, we have trained using ≈90s speech
signals from subset HS-B and tested using ≈30s signals from
subsets HS-C and TTS-C. Training signals for the SVM SV
system were segmented into eight utterances per speaker and
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TABLE I
WALL STREET JOURNAL (WSJ) CORPUS PARTITIONS USED FOR TRAINING
AND TESTING OF TEXT-TO-SPEECH (TTS), SPEAKER VERIFICATION (SV),
AND SYNTHETIC SPEECH DETECTOR (SSD) SYSTEMS.
Human speech HS-A HS-B HS-C
(HS) train TTS train SV test SV
train SSD test SSD
Synthetic speech TTS-B TTS-C
(TTS) train SSD test SV
test SSD
transCoded speech CS-B
(CS) train SSD
used to construct GMM supervectors as described in Section
II-A. The evaluation for human speech was designed so that
each test utterance has an associated true claim and 282 false
claims yielding a total of 2832 tests. The EERs are 0.284%,
0.002% for the GMM-UBM, SVM system respectively. The
low EERs (< 0.3% for both SV systems) are due to the ideal
nature of the recordings in the WSJ corpus and the accuracy of
the SV systems. Table II row 2 shows the acceptance rates of
the SV systems under human speech for true claims as 99.7%,
100% for the GMM-UBM, SVM system respectively.
The evaluation for synthetic speech was designed so that
each test utterance has an associated matched claim yielding
283 tests for imposture. (In a realistic imposture scenario,
a speech signal targeted at a specific speaker will be syn-
thesized and a claim only for that speaker will be submit-
ted, i.e. matched claim.) For both SV systems, the decision
thresholds are chosen for EER under human speech signal
tests. Table II row 3 shows the results where we see over
81% of synthetic speech signals with an associated matched
claim will be accepted by the SV systems. As described in
an earlier paper, this result is due to significant overlap in the
score distributions for human and synthetic speech, as shown
in Fig. 6 [24]. Thus, adjustments in decision thresholding or
standard score normalization techniques cannot differentiate
between true and matched claims originating from human and
synthesized speech [50], [51]. For completeness in Fig. 6,
we show the score distributions for synthesized speech, false
claim (imposter) even though in the imposture scenario, only
matched claims would be submitted.
B. Evaluation of Synthetic Speech Detector
We trained the SSD, described in Section IV-B, on human
speech using HS-B and synthetic speech using TTS-B as in
Table I and evaluated classifier accuracy with human speech
from HS-C and synthetic speech from TTS-C. These results
are shown in Table III row 1 where we find 100% accuracy
in classifying a speech signal as either human or synthetic.
As mentioned earlier, constructing synthetic voices for each
human registered in the SV system is not very practical, so
we trained the SSD using transcoded human speech CS-B
as a surrogate for synthetic speech. These results are shown
in Table III where we find that with the decision threshold
set to zero, human speech signals are classified with 100%
TABLE II
ACCEPTANCE RATES FOR HUMAN SPEECH (TRUE CLAIMANT) AND
SYNTHETIC SPEECH (MATCHED CLAIM) FOR OVERALL SYSTEM
CONSISTING OF SPEAKER VERIFICATION (SV) AND SYNTHETIC SPEECH
DETECTOR (SSD). IDEALLY THE SYSTEM HAS 100% ACCEPTANCE RATE
FOR HUMAN SPEECH, TRUE CLAIM AND 0% FOR SYNTHETIC SPEECH,
MATCHED CLAIM.
GMM-UBM SVM
Without SSD
Acceptance rate for human, true claim 99.7% 100%
Acceptance rate for synth, matched claim 85.5% 81.3%
With SSD trained on TTS-B
Acceptance rate for human, true claim 99.6% 100%
Acceptance rate for synth, matched claim 0.0% 0.0%
With SSD trained on CS-B
Acceptance rate for human, true claim 99.6% 100%
Acceptance rate for synth, matched claim 8.8% 8.8%
With SSD (set for EER) trained on CS-B
Acceptance rate for human, true claim 96.8% 97.2%
Acceptance rate for synth, matched claim 2.5% 2.5%
TABLE III
ACCURACY RATES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN AND SYNTHETIC
SPEECH. CLASSIFIER IS TRAINED WITH HUMAN SPEECH HS-B AND
EITHER TTS-B OR CS-B FOR SYNTHETIC SPEECH. CLASSIFIER IS TESTED
USING HS-C AND TTS-C. RESULTS ARE BASED ON A ZERO THRESHOLD
FOR LOG-LIKELIHOOD RATIO (12) AND INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL RESULT
FOR CS-B WHERE THRESHOLD IS ADJUSTED FOR EER.
Human Speech Synthetic Speech
Training Data (HS-C) (TTS-C)
HS-B/TTS-B 100% 100%
HS-B/CS-B 100% 90.10%
HS-B/CS-B (EER) 97.17% 97.17%
accuracy and synthetic speech signals are classified with
90.10% accuracy. With the decision threshold set at 1.65 for
EER, we find 97.17% accuracy in classifying a speech signal
as either human or synthetic. Approximate distributions for
the classifier scores, ΛRPS(Y) are shown in Fig. 7 where we
see that with transcoded speech (CS-B models) it is necessary
to adjust the decision threshold slightly upward for EER.
C. Evaluation of Sensitivity of Synthetic Speech Detector
In the evaluation of the SSD in Section VI-B, we have
assumed that the same vocoder (STRAIGHT) and phase model
(minimum phase) have been used in both training and test
stages. Although STRAIGHT is the most popular approach
to vocoding and the minimum phase model is normally used,
in a real scenario, a different type of vocoder (e.g. [52]) and
phase model could be used for imposture. Therefore we have
investigated sensitivity to vocoder mismatch by experimenting
with a simple vocoder which uses pulse/white noise excitation
and the MLSA filter [42], [53]. We have also investigated
sensitivity to phase model mismatch by experimenting with
group delay modification [54].
Because the SSD features are entirely phased-based, any
mismatch between vocoder and phase model which produces
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Fig. 6. Approximate score distributions for (a) GMM-UBM and (b) SVM
using GMM supervectors SV systems with human and synthesized speech.
Distributions for human speech, true claimant (green lines, o) and synthesized
speech, matched claimant (black lines, x) have significant overlap leading to
a 81% acceptance rate for synthetic speech with matched claims.
different phase characteristics, may render the classifier’s
ability to detect synthetic speech unreliable. We have ob-
served this effect in informal tests. When we train the SSD
using the aforementioned vocoders, the accuracy of synthetic
speech detection falls from 90.1% obtained with the orig-
inal STRAIGHT vocoder, to 6.3% when training with the
pulse/white noise excitation vocoder, and to 50% when train-
ing with the group delay modification vocoder. In all cases,
the tests were done using TTS-C. On the other hand, classifier
accuracy for the human speech remains at 100%. In order to
address this issue, future research of a vocoder-independent
and phase-adaptive approach such as MAP adaptation of
the RPS-GMMs used for the SSD system, will have to be
undertaken.
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Fig. 7. Approximate distributions for the classifier scores, ΛRPS(Y) when
tested with human and synthetic speech. The models for Human Speech are
trained with HS-B. Blue and red curves show the classifier performance when
the models for synthetic speech are trained using TTS-B. Cyan and magenta
curves show the classifier performance when the models for synthetic speech
are trained using coded speech CS-B. Both classifiers were tested with human
speech HS-C and synthetic speech TTS-C.
D. Evaluation of Overall System
Next, we evaluated the overall system which includes the
SV and SSD systems as illustrated in Fig. 5. Using the
proposed SSD trained on TTS-B, we see in Table II rows 5-6,
there is only a slight 0.1% drop to 99.6% in the acceptance rate
for human speech for the GMM-UBM system and no change
with the SVM system while the acceptance rate for synthetic
speech is now reduced to 0% from over 81% thus clearly
illustrating the effectiveness of the SSD using RPS features.
Training the SSD on CS-B, we see in Table II no change
in the acceptance rate for human speech compared to training
with TTS-B and an acceptance rate for synthetic speech of
8.8% for both SV systems. Finally, adjusting the decision
threshold in the SSD for EER, we see in Table II a reduction
in acceptance rate for synthetic speech to 2.5% with a slight
decrease in acceptance rate for human speech (around 97%).
From these results, we conclude that the SSD trained on
transcoded speech can drastically reduce the number of ac-
cepted matched claims associated with synthetic speech, with
only a slight loss in SV accuracy for human speech. Thus the
proposed SSD using RPS features is an accurate and effective
method for securing the SV systems against imposture using
synthetic speech.
E. Evaluation of an Integrated System
Essentially Fig. 5 represents a system consisting of two
separate classifiers: SV using MFCC features and SSD us-
ing RPS features. These classifiers can be integrated into a
single classifier which uses vectors composed of both MFCC
and RPS features. We extracted 53-D feature vectors by
concatenating the MFCC feature vector (32-D) described in
Section II-A with the RPS feature vector (21-D) described
in Section IV-B. In the first simulation, the GMM-UBM and
SVM classifiers based on the MFCC-RPS feature vectors were
trained using HS-B only and in the second simulation, were
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trained using both HS-B and TTS-B datasets. When using HS-
B and TTS-B, synthetic speakers were treated as imposters in
the training stage. The systems were evaluated using HS-C
and TTS-C datasets and the results are shown in Table IV.
To begin the evaluation of the integrated system, we first
must establish whether the addition of RPS features compro-
mises SV accuracy when the system is trained and tested
only with human speech. For this case, the addition of the
RPS features slightly raises the EER to 0.35%, 0.02% for the
GMM-UBM, SVM system, respectively as compared to the
SV system which uses MFCC features only. The acceptance
rates for true claims (99.7% for GMM-UBM, 100.0% for
SVM) remain the same as compared to the SV system which
uses MFCC features only. These results thus demonstrate that
the addition of the RPS features does not appreciably change
SV accuracy under human speech.
Earlier, we illustrated the imposture problem by demon-
strating that when the SV systems using MFCC features were
trained on human speech and tested with synthetic speech,
the acceptance rates for matched claims were high (85.5%,
81.3% for the GMM-UBM, SVM systems, respectively). With
the integrated system (GMM-UBM classifier), the acceptance
rate for matched claims increases to 88.7% from 85.5%. On
the other hand, the SVM system shows a notable drop in
the acceptance rate to 56.2% from 81.3%. Unfortunately, both
acceptance rates for synthetic speech with matched claims are
still unacceptably high.
Next, we compare the integrated system trained with human
and synthetic speech to the system composed of separate
SV and SSD stages in Fig. 5. When the integrated system
is tested with human speech, the acceptance rates for true
claims drops slightly to 99.3% for the GMM-UBM system and
remains the same 100% for the SVM system. When the GMM-
UBM integrated system is evaluated with synthetic speech, the
acceptance rate for matched claims is 40.6%. Not surprisingly,
the GMM-UBM integrated system appears to have an average
performance with synthetic speech between the stand-alone
rates of the SV using MFCCs (85.5%) and the SSD using
RPS (0.0%). When the SVM integrated system is evaluated
with synthetic speech, the acceptance rate for matched claims
is 3.5% which is still higher than for the system composed
of separate SV and SSD stages which is also 0.0% (Table II,
row 6). For both GMM-UBM and SVM integrated systems,
inclusion of synthetic speech signals in training lowers the
acceptance rates for synthetic speech, matched claims by
around 50% (from 88.7% to 40.6% for GMM-UBM and from
56.2% to 3.5% for SVM). However, these results demonstrate
that the proposed system composed of separate SV and SSD
classifiers (Fig. 5) performs better than the integrated system.
Nevertheless, the performance of the integrated SVM system
is notable in that it does not use a separate synthetic impostor
model for each speaker as the separate SSD does. Since
training with CS-B leads to a less accurate model for synthetic
speech than with TTS-B (see Table II, rows 6, 9, and 12) and
results for the integrated system trained with TTS-B are worse
than with the separate system, the integrated system is not
trained with CS-B and evaluated.
TABLE IV
ACCEPTANCE RATES FOR HUMAN SPEECH (TRUE CLAIMANT) AND
SYNTHETIC SPEECH (MATCHED CLAIM) FOR THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM
(SINGLE CLASSIFIER) WHICH USES VECTORS COMPOSED OF BOTH MFCC
AND RPS FEATURES. IDEALLY THE SYSTEM HAS 100% ACCEPTANCE
RATE FOR HUMAN SPEECH, TRUE CLAIM AND 0% FOR SYNTHETIC
SPEECH, MATCHED CLAIM.
GMM-UBM SVM
Integrated System Trained on HS-B
Acceptance rate for human, true claim 99.7% 100%
Acceptance rate for synthetic, matched claim 88.7% 56.2%
Integrated System Trained on HS-B and TTS-B
Acceptance rate for human, true claim 99.3% 100%
Acceptance rate for synthetic, matched claim 40.6% 3.5%
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have evaluated the vulnerability of speaker
verification (SV) to imposture using synthetic speech. Using
the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) corpus and two different SV
systems (GMM-UBM and SVM using GMM supervectors),
we have shown that with state-of-the-art speech synthesis,
over 81% of matched claims, i.e. a synthetic speech signal
matched to a targeted speaker and an identity claim of that
same speaker, are accepted. Thus despite the excellent perfor-
mance of the SV systems under human speech, the quality of
synthesized speech is high enough to allow these synthesized
voices to pass for true human claimants and hence poses a
potential security problem.
We have proposed a novel synthetic speech detector (SSD)
based on relative phase shift (RPS) features. Although the SSD
can detect human and synthetic speech with 100% accuracy,
training requires that a TTS synthesizer be constructed for each
speaker in the SV system which is not practical. Therefore,
we have proposed using transcoded speech as a surrogate
for synthetic speech in training the SSD. Our results show
that we can reduce the acceptance rate of synthetic speech,
matched claims from over 81% to 2.5%, with a less than 3%
drop in the acceptance rate for human speech, true claimants.
However, the system is sensitive to the vocoder used: the same
vocoder used by the impostor must be used to train the system.
The investigation of vocoder independent techniques is left for
future work.
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